Do the “rebels” in Syria and the Turkish government try to enforce a NATO intervention in Syria with lies? This question is addressed by Middle East expert Guenter Meyer and investigative journalist Lars Schall.
By Prof Guenter Meyer and Lars Schall
In addition to the following article we also would like to recommend to read an exclusive in-depth interview with Prof Guenter Meyer for Asia Times Online related to the Syrian civil war and its international dimensions, “On Syria and way beyond“.
Professor Dr Guenter Meyer has for almost 40 years carried out empirical research on the social, economic and political development in Arab countries and has published more than 150 books and articles, especially on Syria, Egypt, Yemen and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. He directs the Center for Research on the Arab World at the Johannes Gutenberg University in Mainz, Germany, which is one of the world’s leading information centers for the dissemination of news and research on the Middle East. Professor Meyer is president of the European Association for Middle Eastern Studies (EURAMES), and chairman of the International Advisory Council of the World Congress for Middle Eastern Studies (WOCMES).
A poison gas conspiracy of Assad opponents?
by Prof Guenter Meyer, Translation by Lars Schall
Do rebels and Erdogan try to enforce a NATO intervention in Syria with a poison gas lie?
President Obama had stated in August 2012 that the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime would cross the „red line“ that would entail a U.S. intervention in Syria. Meanwhile, the intelligence agencies in Israel and the USA have confirmed the allegations of the rebels, that poison gas was used against the civilian population. Nevertheless, the U.S. president is not ready yet to make good on his earlier threats against the Syrian regime, because it is not proven by whom the poison gas was used. Compelling arguments suggest that there was not the slightest reason why government forces should have attacked the rebels with chemical weapons. Instead, everything suggests that the insurgents have used poison gas to make the government responsible for this crime, and thereby increase the pressure on the regime. The same calculations also seem to be the case regarding the recent allegations of the Turkish Prime Minister in an NBC interview, whereupon at least 200 poison gas shells were fired by Syrian government forces.
Use of chemical weapons by the regime absurd for strategic and tactical reasons
To investigate a crime, the first question to ask is: Who benefits? Certainly not the Assad regime! It is totally absurd that the government forces used poison gas in the present situation, since they are with their conventional weapons by far superior to the rebels, and in particular with their warplanes they can fight the insurgents directly. With this they also do not risk that poison gas is drifting in the wrong direction through a change in the wind direction. Moreover, the regime is aware that an attack with chemical weapons is exactly the signal for which the insurgents have been waiting to reinforce their demands for weapons supplies. Thus, it is obvious that the use of poison gas only benefits the insurgents, whereas the position of the Syrian regime is weakened seriously.
Victims of the poison gas attack were supporters of the Assad regime
If the government forces were responsible for the use of chemical weapons, then the victims would need to be opponents of the regime. Yet, the first poison gas attack with the highest number of victims was directed against the village of Khan al-Assal north of Aleppo, whose population is on the side of the regime. The majority of the inhabitants are Shiites, who are fought by the Sunni rebels. That troops of the government attack a village controlled by them with chemical weapons und also kill beyond the Shiite residents three of their own soldiers defies logic. Only insurgents can be responsible for this attack.
Poison gas attack by jihadists with Turkish support?
According to research done by the British newspaper The Guardian, the poison gas attack was carried out by a small missile equipped with a poison gas grenade, which was fired from the location of Bab near the Turkish border. This place is a hotbed of the jihadist Nusra Front that has joined al-Qaeda.
But how did chemical warfare agents came into the possession of the rebels? Did they stem from stocks of the Syrian regime? The chemical weapons storages are guarded not only by Alawite elite soldiers, but also by members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Western intelligence agencies have repeatedly stressed that the Syrian chemical weapons storages are safe as long as the regime remains in power. It can be therefore precluded that chemical weapons have found their way from here to the rebels. Instead, it is assumed that the poison gas grenade used in Bab has come into the hands of the jihadists from Turkish territory over the adjacent open border.
A direct participation of the Turkish intelligence service in such a supply is at least not excluded and corresponds with the interests of Ankara. With the support of a chemical weapons use in Syria, for which then the regime is blamed, the Erdogan government has the ability to increase the pressure on Obama in order to establish the no-fly zone in Syria that’s long-demanded by the Turkish government.
Del Ponte confirms „strong, concrete suspicions“ of sarin gas insert by rebels
The UN Independent Commission of Inquiry on Syria has conducted numerous interviews outside of the country with victims, doctors and in field hospitals in connection with the use of poison gas. The prominent Commissioner Carla Del Ponte said then in an interview as a result of the investigation that there were „strong, concrete suspicions, but not yet incontrovertible proof of the use of sarin gas. This was used on the part of the opposition, not by the government authorities.“ The UN stressed promptly thereafter that investigators had “not reached conclusive findings as to the use of chemical weapons in Syria by any parties to the conflict.” However, due to all indicators available, only the rebels come into question as responsible for the use of chemical weapons, as Del Ponte points out in another interview.
Staging a poison gas lie by the Turkish intelligence service?
After the severe setback for the previous allegations of chemical weapons use by the Assad regime, Prime Minister Erdogan is now showing up with alleged new evidence for the crossing of the „red line“ in order to increase the pressure on Washington. The timing of these revelations before his upcoming visit to the United States is chosen optimally. He claimed in an interview with NBC that the Turkish intelligence service has the remainders of at least 200 missiles with poison gas traces that were used by the regime in Syria. As further evidence he cites the injuries of Syrians, who were treated in Turkish hospitals. This alleged evidence is even less convincing than the earlier propaganda hoaxes of the rebels. If the regime had actually used such an extent of weapons of mass destruction against its own people, the number of casualties would be much higher than the previously stated 15 dead and fewer than 100 injured. The dissemination of such alleged evidence is solely in the interests of the Turkish government to enforce a military intervention by NATO in Syria.
Already a former Turkish grenade lie to deploy Patriot batteries?
Here the suspicion arises that the Turkish government is trying for the second time to draw the NATO partners into the Syrian war by using false reports. The journalist Lars Schall became aware in the semi-official Austrian military journal “Der Soldat” (“The Soldier”, Issue No. 1/2013, January 18, 2013) of the following report: “Turkey: The mortar grenade from Syria, that killed five Turks, came clearly from NATO stocks. It seems as if NATO member Turkey supported the Syrian rebels with arms. However, these supplies would have needed to be coordinated with other NATO countries.“ This attack on Turkish territory, for which the Syrian government was blamed by Ankara, provided the justification for the deployment of NATO troops and Patriot missiles near the Turkish-Syrian border. Lars Schall undertook intensive efforts to obtain confirmation of the use of the NATO grenade with the appropriate authorities – in vain. However, there was also no one willing to deny this report. Given the recent allegations by the Turkish government, that report in the military magazine has to be seen in a completely new light.
Weapons from NATO (Turkey) stocks in Akçakale: A puzzle?
by Lars Schall
As Prof Meyer has just pointed out, a remarkable short report appeared in January of this year in the semi-official military journal „Der Soldat,“ which gets published in Austria since 1956. In connection with the mortar grenade attack on the Turkish-Syrian border, that killed five Turkish civilians in October 2012, the report created the impression that the grenade attack on Turkish soil was staged. If the report were true, NATO countries and their Turkish allies would have initiated the fire raid into Akçakale on October 3, 2012, which ultimately led to the deployment of NATO troops and Patriot missiles to Syria’s border with Turkey. Turkey immediately had accused the Assad regime to have been involved in the attack, while the NATO Council strongly condemned the attack. However, after a Turkish retaliation in the region around the valley of Abiyad in the Syrian province Rakka there was no official independent investigation of the shelling of Akçakale taking place. Instead, the Turkish parliament authorized the Turkish Army to be allowed to intervene in the course of self-defense in other states. A Turkish request for the stationing of Patriot missiles was granted fast-track before Christmas, and since February six batteries, which come from Germany, the Netherlands and the USA, are in the field in Turkey.
The Turkish journalist Osman Cutsay recently reported on the efforts that yours truly undertook together with Pepe Escobar, the roving eye of Asia Times, to track down the truth of the report of „Der Soldat“. The report by Mr Cutsay appeared in the Turkish newspaper „soL“ on May 4, 2013. For his report he interviewed me in German. Below appears a translation of that interview into English.
In a media request to the general staff of the Turkish Army, Pepe Escobar and I wanted to find out what those authorities think about the report that was published by “Der Soldat”. NATO Headquarters in Brussels has told us officially that the Turkish Army was the one to ask about forensic and investigative questions related to the shelling of Akçakale. The media request that Pepe Escobar and I sent to the general staff of the Turkish Army (original from April 17) was renewed on May 7. So far we’ve received no response to it. You can read the request (as well as our conversation with NATO HQ) in the end notes of this interview/report.
Osman Cutsay: What was particularly interesting for you with regards to the short report of „Der Soldat“? What could be the background of those lines? What were your guesses and your first impressions?
Lars Schall: It was interesting first of all that the short report suggested something that I assumed anyway when the attack happened, namely that the Assad regime was not responsible for the attack, but was blamed for it. The argumentation that was brought forward by official politics and the „state-supporting“ media of the West that the Assad regime was the one to blame made no sense to me at that time. Why should the Assad regime do something like that? Would it have gained any benefits because of this? Not at all. On the contrary, we have seen it been demonstrated, so to speak. And now you might think of the Assad regime whatever you want – but it doesn’t seem being stupid to me (although not being stupid nowadays seems to boil down to live dangerously in geopolitical dimensions, insofar not being stupid may have to be seen relatively).
Furthermore, the short report contradicted completely what had been brought more or less in unison to the recipients of the „state-supporting” media. I’ve growingly accustomed to be very skeptical when all major media outlets – almost as if on command – begin to march in the same direction. And in the case of the civil war in Syria a bias of the Western media in favor of the „rebels“ (as before seen with the fall of the regime in Libya, but not only there) can hardly be denied. The culprit for the attack was practically found immediately. And now there was this contradictory report which came from „Der Soldat“. Here you have to know that „Der Soldat“ is published privately in close cooperation with the Austrian Ministry of Defense and Sports since 1956. The paper is aimed at officers and decision-makers in the field of defense policy, and in that sense the Ministry has obviously an interest to communicate its ideas to the public. The writers are – at least as far as I know – consistently former and active soldiers. So this is a little bit different than if I would post such a statement of fact on my small website.
When I stumbled across the short report more or less by accident, I also noted that the alternative media seemed to have made little efforts to explore the accuracy of this report exhaustively before the dissemination of this report took place – which has been mostly in the middle / end of March. I noticed in any case only one exception, which had tried to do it partly otherwise, whereas in the other cases they seemed only to crib from each other.
Crucially, policy has been made with the attack, which continues until today. My country is also involved in this. If the short report would be true, this policy could perhaps be reversed to a certain degree and a climate of skepticism could be created, if such an event should happen again. I would perceive this as progress.
Moreover, if it were true, then this could help to disclose certain structures of the political reality to a larger public which gets it very rarely to see, because these structures take place under the covers and also, whenever possible, are held there. In your country this phenomenon is called „Derin Devlet“. I visited, for example, for many years at the university seminars in political science; what you call „Derin Devlet“ was never mentioned by any professor, not even rudimentary, they never had the idea to address it, and if only superficially. If that would change and the larger public would be sensitized to it, I would perceive this also as progress.
However, I did not take the report at face value, either. The assumption, for example, that Turkey would have needed to come to an agreement with the NATO states related to a supply of grenades from NATO stocks, is to me even less likely than that the attack had been committed by the Assad regime. I believe that the grey area of the open and / or covert foreign policy of Turkey after Davatoğlu would at best only seen the necessity to reinsure itself by the United States. Furthermore, the Turkish general staff and those things that function there as „Stay Behind“ or special operations, degenerated through the ideological shock of the general staff to a lack of clarity in which the knowledge about the initiator of the weapons delivery or about the added provocation is actually of very little use.
As for the source of the short report, I assumed that it would have come probably from intelligence circles – at least I had that assumption, as the Austrian army is represented both on the Golan Heights and at the border of Lebanon and Israel with UN blue helmets, and with the UN blue helmets there are always people from intelligence services. Everyone does it like this, so why should the Austrians do it differently?
All in all it seemed to me that enough tokens had been placed at the grand roulette table in order to make me want to look into the matter personally.
OC: What have you done or attempted to do to get this information confirmed? Which kind of agencies and personalities have you forwarded your questions?
LS: First of all, I turned to the place from which the report originated, meaning „Der Soldat,“ before I wanted to turn afterwards to the Ministry of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany and the general staff of Turkey. However, the freelancer who is responsible for the report, was, to put it mildly, not very informative towards me. Nonetheless, I turned then to the Federal Ministry of Defense in Germany. There I was directed to the Press Office of NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Until I finally got through with my questions it took some time. Ultimately, I was told that I would have to contact the Turkish authorities regarding the investigation / origin of the grenade. Henceforth I was officially informed that any reports were completely wrong, which suggested that NATO was involved in this attack. (1) This would, if true, confirm my initial guess, but contradict the report by the staff of „Der Soldat“. So I sent him and his editor this official NATO statement and asked for a comment. However, I never received any related to that NATO statement.
I was also interested in what the Ministry of Defense of Austria had to say about the report in „Der Soldat“. The information was long time in the coming, the written request had to be repeated twice and only a phone call from me with Vienna brought some movement into the game, yet the information that I eventually received did not address the report and its message as such. The same was true when the editor of „Der Soldat“ finally wrote to me. Instead of addressing the question of how „Der Soldat“ would actually backup the claim that had been put forward in the report, I received only an unsolicited little lesson in the practice of journalism, but not a single word related to my real concern. That the statement by NATO most formally contradicts their report at a crucial point doesn’t seem to affect anyone there.
Meanwhile, I sent a request to the Turkish general staff. (2) Until today I did not receive any information. This is also true for the editorial board of the Turkish newspaper „Sabah“, when I tried to draw their attention to the request for the Turkish general staff. In addition, I tried to get in touch via the Press Office of the U.S. Army in Europe with the retired Lt. Gen. Mark P. Hertling, because when he was still on active duty, he made an interesting statement that was relatively compliant with the report in „Der Soldat“. In the end I got a clarification from him that you cite in your report. (3)
After all of this, I find myself, to use a military term, rather in no man’s land.
OC: How did they respond if you have received an answer? And how do you assess this „secrecy“ and the reasons for it? In other words, what and why is this information and the brief report of the NATO stocks in Akçakale concealed?
LS: From the Austrian side I really got no answer. Instead, a wind of arrogance coming from Vienna blew into my workroom. They steered clear away from the real questions and let smokescreens rise. In addition, I was pointed to my alleged shortcomings. NATO gave a not unimportant information by partially contradicting the report – and one would have thought that this would have caused the Austrians to do something in terms of credibility. But no way!
I cannot really interpret the „secrecy“, which I at least encountered in Vienna and Ankara, in a way that would enable me to say great things about it – except, of course, that something is at stake here. If there is something that makes you feel uncomfortable, one tries – if possible – to ignore it, which is in the grand scale no different than in the small scale. Instead, those that come along with the unpleasantness get involved in diversions. And to expect anything else than “secrecy” on the part of Ankara would have been thoroughly naïve anyway. That’s the reason why I ordered a Turkish translation of my request from the outset, so that I would perhaps be able to get attention from the Turkish media. The matter will be clarified in Turkey itself, or not at all.
O.C.: What now? What to do with this bloody event and with this report?
LS: I personally can do nothing at this point in time, I can only speak to you about it – but this is very much given what I’ve just said. I can also make your readers aware that the recent poison gas attack in Syria and the way it is reported in the „state-supporting“ media of the West has parallels to the mortar grenade attack in October 2012 on the Syrian-Turkish border.
Post Scriptum: It’s not over yet, is it?
On May 11, I wrote again to NATO HQ, showing the spokesperson of NATO, Oana Lungescu, a draft of what you’ve just read:
Subject: Media Request re Poison gas attack / Mortar grenade incident October 2012
Dear Ms. Lungescu, dear Mr. Eichenlaub,
please find below the result of the research so far related to the topic of alleged „false flag“ activities. It’s about to be published soon.
I have two questions:
a) What’s your comment on Prof Guenter Meyer’s reflections re the recent poison gas attack?
b) Could you tell me someone in the Turkish Army (and give me the related e-mail address), whom I could write directly related to the mortar grenade incident in October 2012? Doing it via this channel:
http://www.tsk.tr/ing/13_contact_us/contact_us.htm // gnkur@tsk.tr
wasn’t successful — as you can see below.
Attached you can find the report by Osman Cutsay (see page 9).
Kind regards,
Lars Schall.
Mr. Eichenlaub answered then for NATO:
Dear Mr Schall,
We have already made NATO’s position clear in our emails on 15 and 24 April 2013.
We have nothing to add at this point in time.
With kind regards,
Matthias
SOURCES:
(1) Here’s the media request that was sent with regards to the incident at the Syrian-Turkish border October 2012 to NATO Headquarters in Brussels:
Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,
my name is Lars Schall, I am a freelance journalist from Germany (for example Asia Times Online). I copy this e-mail to Pepe Escobar, geopolitical analyst for Asia Times Online.
The Austrian military journal “Der Soldat”, Issue No. 1/2013, January 18, 2013 reported that the mortar grenade that was fired from Syrian territory at the end of 2012 and killed five Turkish citizens came clearly from NATO stocks. Due to the fact that not least this incident lead to the deployment of Patriot air defense systems from Germany and other countries, the report in the semi-official journal is of particular importance to me. The legal basis for the German participation in the deployment to Turkey was Article 51 of the UN Charter – the right to individual and collective self-defense -, as well as the decision of the NATO Council in accordance with Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty – to be able to exercise this right in the event of an attack from the Syrian side. As a German journalist, I am interested to learn the following as a matter of public interest:
1.Do you have the same insights with regards to the mortar grenade as the journal “Der Soldat”?
2.If so, have you done research related to the questions: how munition from NATO stocks reached the Syrian territory, and: who fired the mortar grenade?
3.Which results did these investigations have?
4.Do you have any insights whether the mortar grenade was fired from Syria to Turkey with the intent to involve the North Atlantic alliance in the Syrian civil war?
5.Was the mortar grenade to your knowledge not coming from NATO stocks?
Kind regards,
Lars Schall.
“Der Soldat”, Issue No. 1/2013, January 18, 2013:
“Turkey: The mortar grenade from Syria, that killed five Turks, came clearly from NATO stocks. It seems as if NATO member Turkey supported the Syrian rebels with arms. However, these supplies would have needed to be coordinated with other NATO countries. “
“Der Soldat”, Ausgabe Nr. 1/2013, 18. Januar 2013:
“Türkei: Jene Werfergranate aus Syrien, die fünf Türken tötete, stammt eindeutig aus NATO-Beständen. Es scheint so, als hätte das NATO-Mitglied Türkei die syrischen Aufständischen mit Waffenlieferungen unterstützt. Allerdings müssten diese Lieferungen mit anderen NATO-Staaten abgestimmt sein.“
The answer from NATO:
RE: [Fwd: [Fwd: Media Request re Incident Syrian-Turkish border October 2012]]
Classification: None (Public)
Dear Mr Schall,
My colleagues from the German Ministry of Defence have forwarded your questions concerning the shelling of the Turkish town of Akcakale on 3 October 2012 to us. You can find our response your questions below. This can be attributed to a NATO official. I also understand that you could not find a contact number or email for the NATO Press Office. The NATO spokesperson can be reached at XX@int. The entire press team can be reached at moc@int or at +3====. In case you urgently need to reach us during afterhours or on weekends you can contact us at: +3====.
“The North Atlantic Council met on 3 October at the request of Turkey to discuss the continuous shelling of locations in Turkey adjacent to the Turkish-Syrian border by the Syrian regime forces. In a statement issued after the meeting, Allies stressed that the shelling on 3 October 2012, which caused the death of five Turkish citizens and injured many, constituted a cause of greatest concern and was strongly condemned by all Allies. Allies also demanded the immediate cessation of such aggressive acts against an Ally, and urged the Syrian regime to put an end to flagrant violations of international law. Forensic and investigative questions relating to the 3 October incident are for the Turkish authorities to address. NATO as an organisation never conducted an investigation into this incident. But any reports that suggest that NATO was involved in this attack are totally wrong.
NATO’s Patriot mission in Turkey is to help protect and defend Turkey’s population and territory against ballistic missile threats from across its border with Syria. This deployment is about NATO’s core task – the protection and defence of its Allies. NATO foreign ministers made clear this deployment is purely defensive, not offensive and not in support of a no-fly zone”.
Press and Media Section
NATO Headquarters Brussels
A second request, that contained our original request and NATO’s answer to it, was sent then on the same day to the spokesperson of NATO, Oana Lungescu:
Dear Ms. Lungescu,
my name is Lars Schall, I am a freelance writer from Germany (for example Asia Times Online). I copy this e-mail to Pepe Escobar, geopolitical analyst for Asia Times Online.
Can you take a look at this procedure below, please?
As far as Mr. Escobar and I can see there are basically three options possible regarding the report in the Austrian military journal “Der Soldat”:
a) NATO was robbed;
b) NATO / the Turkish army brought NATO munition across the Syrian-Turkish border;
or
c) Col. Eisler isn’t telling the truth in his report in “Der Soldat“:
“Der Soldat”, Issue No. 1/2013, January 18, 2013:
“Turkey: The mortar grenade from Syria, that killed five Turks, came clearly from NATO stocks. It seems as if NATO member Turkey supported the Syrian rebels with arms. However, these supplies would have needed to be coordinated with other NATO countries. “
Is this report true, yes or no? If the answer is no, does NATO maintain that this report is a complete fabrication? If the answer is yes, does NATO admit some shadowy entity may have had access to its grenade stash? And in this case, would NATO conduct an internal investigation?
Kind regards,
Lars Schall.
The answer from NATO HQ on April 24:
Classification: None (Public)
Dear Mr Schall,
Ms Lungescu asked me to reply to you on her behalf. Should you wish to quote, please attribute our answer to a NATO official.
“As we explained in an earlier response to your email on 15 April, questions relating to the 3 October 2012 incident are for the Turkish authorities to address. NATO never conducted an investigation into this incident. But I can assure you that any reports that suggest that NATO was involved in this attack are totally wrong. Furthermore, at no time during the Syria crisis have NATO troops been inside Syria nor has NATO delivered weapons to any group or individual in Syria. With regard to your question whether NATO was robbed, I can tell you that NATO as an organisation does not possess its own ammunition stocks. In general, equipment and ammunition used during NATO operations are owned by Allies but placed under NATO command on a case-by-case basis and for a specific time”.
Press and Media Section
NATO Headquarters Brussels
(2) The request that we sent to the general staff of the Turkish Armed Forces both in Turkish and English said:
Medya Talebi Türkçe / İngilizce // Media Request Turkish / English
Bayanlar ve Baylar! Dear Ladies and Gentlemen!
Mr. Escobar and I would appreciate to get your answers both in Turkish and English.
Adım Lars Schall, Almanya’dan bir serbest gazeteciyim (Asia Times Online).Bu e-posta mesajını Asia Times Online jeopolitik analisti Pepe Escobar’a da gönderiyorum.
Aşağıdaki mesajı Türk Genel Kurmay Başkanı’na / Türk ordusunun sözcüsüne iletmek arzusundayız:
Avusturya’nın askeri dergilerinden “Der Soldat”ın 18 Ocak 2013 tarihli 1/2013 sayısında, 2012 yılının sonlarında Suriye topraklarından atılan ve beş Türk vatandaşının ölümüne neden olan top mermisinin net bir şekilde NATO envanterinden gelen bir mermi olduğu haberine yer verilmiştir.Bu olayın Almanya’dan ve diğer ülkelerden Patriot hava savunma sistemlerinin savaş düzeni almasına yol açmış olması sebebiyle, yarı-resmi dergide yer alan haber benim için özel bir önem arz etmektedir. Türkiye’ye yapılan savaş düzeni almada Alman iştirakinin yasal dayanağı BM Sözleşmesinin 51. Maddesi -münferit ve müşterek meşru müdafaa-, ve ayrıca Kuzey Atlantik Antlaşması’nın 4. Maddesi uyarınca verilen NATO Konseyi kararı -bahse konu hakkın Suriye tarafından gelecek olası bir saldırı halinde kullanılabilmesi- olmuştur.
Brüksel’deki NATO karargâhı “Der Soldat”ta yer alan haberle ilgili olarak tarafıma şu bilgileri vermiştir:
“3 Ekim tarihli olayla ilgili adli ve soruşturmaya yönelik soruların muhatabı Türk makamlarıdır. Bir organizasyon olarak NATO, bu olayla ilgili olarak hiçbir zaman bir soruşturma yürütmemiştir.”
Bir Alman gazeteci olarak, aşağıdaki hususlara ilişkin kamu yararı bakımından bilgi sahibi olmayı arzu ediyorum:
1. Top mermisini incelediniz mi, ve top mermisiyle ilgili olarak “Der Soldat” dergisinde yer verilen görüşe katılıyor musunuz?
2. Evet ise: NATO envanterinden alınan mühimmatın nasıl Suriye topraklarına ulaştığı, ve top mermisini kimin ateşlediği sorularına yönelik araştırma yaptınız mı?
3. Soruşturmalar hangi sonuçları verdi?
4. Top mermisinin Suriye’den Türkiye’ye Kuzey Atlantik Paktını Suriye iç savaşına müdahil etmek amacıyla ateşlendiği yönünde bir görüşünüz var mı?
5. Elinizdeki bilgilere göre, top mermisi NATO envanterine ait değil miydi?
“Der Soldat”, Sayı: 1/2013, 18 Ocak 2013:
“Türkiye:Suriye’den fırlatılan ve beş Türkü öldüren top mermisi, net bir şekilde NATO envanterindenmiş.Görüldüğü kadarıyla, NATO üyesi Türkiye, Suriyeli ayaklanmacıları silah göndererek desteklemiş.Oysa bu silahların gönderilmesi, diğer NATO ülkeleriyle koordinasyon halinde yapılmalıydı. “
“Der Soldat”, Ausgabe Nr. 1/2013, 18. Januar 2013:
“Türkei: Jene Werfergranate aus Syrien, die fünf Türken tötete, stammt eindeutig aus NATO-Beständen.Es scheint so, als hätte das NATO-Mitglied Türkei die syrischen Aufständischen mit Waffenlieferungen unterstützt.Allerdings müssten diese Lieferungen mit anderen NATO-Staaten abgestimmt sein.“
Bay Escobar ve tarafımca görüldüğü kadarıyla, Avusturya’lı askeri dergi “Der Soldat”da yer alan haberle ilgili temel olarak üç seçenek söz konusu:
a) NATO soyuldu;
b) NATO / Türk ordusu Suriye-Türkiye sınırı ötesine NATO’ya ait mühimmat getirdi;
veya
c) Albay Eisler “Der Soldat”ta yer alan haberinde gerçeği söylemiyor.
Sizin yorumunuz nedir?
Saygılarımla,
Lars Schall.
Media Request English
Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,
my name is Lars Schall, I am a freelance journalist from Germany (for example Asia Times Online). I copy this e-mail to Pepe Escobar, geopolitical analyst for Asia Times Online. We want to forward the following to the general staff of the Turkish army / the spokesperson of the Turkish army:
The Austrian military journal “Der Soldat”, Issue No. 1/2013, January 18, 2013 reported that the mortar grenade that was fired from Syrian territory at the end of 2012 and killed five Turkish citizens came clearly from NATO stocks. Due to the fact that not least this incident lead to the deployment of Patriot air defense systems from Germany and other countries, the report in the semi-official journal is of particular importance to me. The legal basis for the German participation in the deployment to Turkey was Article 51 of the UN Charter – the right to individual and collective self-defense -, as well as the decision of the NATO Council in accordance with Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty – to be able to excercise this right in the event of an attack from the Syrian side.
NATO HQ in Brussels told me related to the report in “Der Soldat“:
“Forensic and investigative questions relating to the 3 October incident are for the Turkish authorities to address. NATO as an organisation never conducted an investigation into this incident.“
As a German journalist, I am interested to learn the following as a matter of public interest:
1. Did you examine the mortar grenade, and do you have the same insights with regards to the mortar grenade as the journal “Der Soldat”?
2.If so, have you done research related to the questions: how munition from NATO stocks reached the Syrian territory, and: who fired the mortar grenade?
3.Which results did these investigations have?
4.Do you have any insights whether the mortar grenade was fired from Syria to Turkey with the intent to involve the North Atlantic alliance in the Syrian civil war?
5.Was the mortar grenade to your knowledge not coming from NATO stocks?
“Der Soldat”, Issue No. 1/2013, January 18, 2013:
“Turkey: The mortar grenade from Syria, that killed five Turks, came clearly from NATO stocks. It seems as if NATO member Turkey supported the Syrian rebels with arms. However, these supplies would have needed to be coordinated with other NATO countries. “
“Der Soldat”, Ausgabe Nr. 1/2013, 18. Januar 2013:
“Türkei: Jene Werfergranate aus Syrien, die fünf Türken tötete, stammt eindeutig aus NATO-Beständen. Es scheint so, als hätte das NATO-Mitglied Türkei die syrischen Aufständischen mit Waffenlieferungen unterstützt. Allerdings müssten diese Lieferungen mit anderen NATO-Staaten abgestimmt sein.“
As far as Mr. Escobar and I can see there are basically three options possible regarding the report in the Austrian military journal “Der Soldat”:
a) NATO was robbed;
b) NATO / the Turkish army brought NATO munition across the Syrian-Turkish border;
or
c) Col. Eisler isn’t telling the truth in his report in “Der Soldat”.
How do you comment?
Kind regards,
Lars Schall.
(3) On April 24, I sent this e-mail to the Press Office of the U.S. Army Europe (http://www.eur.army.mil/default.asp). It said:
Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,
could you forward the following message to the retired Lieutenant General of the US Army Europe / 7th US Army (USAREUR ) Mark P. Hertling, please?
Thank you!
Dear Lieutenant General Hertling,
my name is Lars Schall, I am a freelance journalist for Asia Times Online. I copy this e-mail to Pepe Escobar, geopolitical analyst for Asia Times Online.
We are working on a story related to the mortar grenade incident on the Syrian-Turkish border in October 2012. Please take a look below.
A media request was sent by us to the general staff of the Turkish armed forces.
The comment by the press office of the Ministry of Defense of Austria was – to be honest with you – not worth the time to write it. The staff of “Der Soldat” didn’t respond to our questions so far.
Our questions for you, Sir: it came to our attention that you’ve stated on October 27, 2012 about the mortar grenade incident:
Origin of Syrian shells into Turkey unclear, US general says
It is not clear who is shooting shells from Syria into Turkey, the commander of the U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling has said, private television channel NTV yesterday.
“We are not sure if these shells are from the Syrian army, from rebels who want to get Turkey involved in the issue or from the PKK [Kurdish Workers’ Party],” he said.
Neither NATO nor U.S. troops want to get involved in the increasingly complex Syrian issue, Hertling said, adding that they were presently only sharing intelligence with Turkey and observing the ongoing events in Syria.
A shell from Syria killed five Turkish civilians in the border town of Akçakale in the southeastern province of Şanlıurfa on Oct. 3.
Can you tell Mr. Escobar and me about your insights regarding the mortar grenade incident? And what do you think about the short report in “Der Soldat”?
Kind regards,
Lars Schall.
Then our conversation with NATO followed.
Ultimately, we received this following message on April 30:
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE
Dear Lars,
Our General Officer engagements office reached out to LTG (ret.) Hertling and he said he did not wish to be interviewed for this article. Regardless, he wanted to clarify his comments made during a press conference after a conference of European Armies. In speaking about artillery impacting in Turkey fired from within Syria, General Hertling was relaying parts of a discussion he had with those in the Turkish military regarding the confusion existing on their border given the complex mix of combatants in Syria. He was not making an official assessment. Hopefully that clarifies LTG Hertling’s involvement with this topic.
Thanks for your interest and best of luck with your story.
Very Respectfully,
Lt. Col. Peggy Kageleiry
Press Desk – Operations, Intelligence, and Logistics Team
Media Relations Division
HQDA Office of the Chief of Public Affairs
