In a lecture that he gave in Copenhagen, Denmark, German financial journalist Lars Schall shows that the claim put forward by Wall Street player / bestselling author Jim Rickards that he has been „rigorous and scientific about the evidence“ re 9/11 insider trading is merely a lousy joke.
By Lars Schall
Here you can watch the lecture on „Informed 9/11 Terror Trading“:
Moreover, in addition to my presentation, here’s what Paul Zarembka, Professor for Economics at the State University of New York, has told me about Jim Rickards‘ „limited hangout“:
I have now read Rickards‘ chapter that you were kind enough to forward. I don’t see it as even a ‚limited hangout‘ of the trading issue unless we reduce that phrase to recognition of good work done by Poteshman and Chesney et al.
Even for those two works, the references are strange. Poteshman’s is stated to be published by the U. of Chicago, but that is not the way academic publication is cited. The proper reference is the J. of Business which happens to be published by U. of Chicago for decades. And Chesney et al’s work is cited without their names and as if the Institute produced it, rather than independent academics employed there. The author works so closely to intelligence agencies that he is characterizing academic work as if it were administratively like those agencies, i.e., any work is the responsibility of the publisher/agency, not individual scholars.
Anyway, what I think can be learned is that the intelligence agencies are taking insider trading seriously, unlike the Commission Report (who Rickards applauds … except — pp. 25-27 — on insider trading). On the bottom of p. 23 Rickards indicates that the Commission knew of Poteshman’s work — so why not cite it as „forthcoming“ (in appeared in the same year, I believe within one quarter of each other) and deal with it? (The Commission, of course, also ignored many reports of hijackers being alive after 9-11.)
He raises the issue of signal amplification. I am not convinced, but if correct, it would imply much less money earned by nefarious characters than would otherwise be the case: much of the earnings would go to those follow like sheep. In any case, Rickards does not even cite the background, unpublished, work behind the Commission Report which claimed that many of the purchasers of AA options were interviewed and stated that they followed the newsletter that was cited; i.e., whoever they were that were NOT the sheep of alleged signal amplification.
An interesting claim is his assertion that the his system MARKINT flashed „red“ on August 7, 2006 for American Airlines. Unfortunately, Chesney’s work on AA goes only to April 2006 (if I have not missed subsequent work) so we cannot cross-check this.
No where in the chapter is there any evidence provided of WHO were the insider traders. This absence is hardly surprising but needs to be recognized.